The body and ethics in Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae by Marika Rose
The body and ethics in Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae

Abstract
This article explores the role of the body in Thomas Aquinas' ethical thought, focusing on the Summa Theologiae. Drawing on Thomas' account of human nature, teleology and ethics, it traces Thomas' account of human embodiment through his discussion of the relationship between human and angelic nature, the beatific vision, law and virtue, and the active and contemplative lives. Against several recent accounts which have presented versions of Thomas as a thinker who is generally positive in his assessment of the human body, it argues that there is a basic tension in Thomas' thought between the desire to locate human distinctiveness in the conjunction of body and soul and the sense that after a certain point, embodiment is precisely that which obstructs progress towards God. This tension is inextricably connected to Thomas' understanding of human calling and discipleship and poses serious challenges to any attempts to draw on Thomas' work as an ethical resource.

	Much has been written about the ethical thought of Thomas Aquinas and its contemporary usefulness, both by theologians and secular thinkers; but until relatively recently, there has been little discussion in this field of the role of Thomas' attitude to embodiment.​[1]​ A flurry of recent works has gone some way to opening up this discussion, however.​[2]​ Three works in particular have recognised the importance of contemporary discussions of embodiment in relation to ethics and have attributed to Thomas a generally positive attitude towards the human body. John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock suggest, in their book Truth in Aquinas, that, for Thomas, the incarnation fundamentally restructures the way we acquire knowledge of God and the world; that because of the incarnation our intellect comes to be instructed via our senses, by touch in the Eucharist.​[3]​ Robert Miner's recent book, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions​[4]​ gives a generally positive account of Thomas' understanding of the role of the passions in human life and flourishing.​[5]​ Graham McAleer's Ecstatic Morality and Sexual Politics: a Catholic and antitotalitarian theory of the body offers an account of the Thomistic body in which an ecstatic generosity is at the heart of embodiment; in which the body and mind are fundamentally congruent, allowing for a peaceful ontology of human nature which, McAleer claims, offers the solution to the problems of contemporary sexual ethics.​[6]​  

	Focusing on Thomas' Summa Theologiae, I want to suggest that these cheerful takes on Thomas' theology of the body miss a crucial ambiguity in his attitude to human embodiment which forms a crucial fault-line at the centre of his discussions of human nature and ethics. This ambiguity renders problematic contemporary appropriations of Thomas' ethics which seek to take seriously questions of human embodiment, and makes it difficult to use Thomas as a resource for ethical reflection without seriously challenging some of his most fundamental assumptions.

	This article will explore the role of the body in the ethics of Thomas Aquinas, beginning with the role of the angels within his hierarchical ordering of the cosmos. Angels, as the highest beings within the created order, function in two different ways within Thomas' account of human nature and embodiment. On the one hand, their presence within Thomas' system suggests that a disembodied creatureliness is not only possible but superior to embodied creatureliness. As the next step up from humankind within the created hierarchy, the disembodied intellect of the angels becomes aspirational: they are the next step on the way towards God. On the other hand, the presence of the angels as disembodied intellectual creatures means that human beings cannot be defined by their intellect alone, but rather by their unique combination of intellect and embodiment. Tracing these opposed tendencies through Thomas' account of the beatific vision, the virtues, and the active and contemplative lives, I will argue that the body is the site of a key fault-line within Thomistic ethics, which contemporary discussions of Thomas would do well to heed.

Angels
	Thomas locates human beings within a neoplatonically-tinged participatory hierarchy of being. He divides the created order into four to five categories which are, in ascending order, inanimate objects, plants, animals, human beings and angels. Inanimate objects simply exist; plants exist and are alive; animals exist, are alive and have sensation; and human beings exist, are alive, have sensation and are rational (rationality being a specifically embodied form of intellect).​[7]​ Thomas includes angels in this taxonomy on some occasions, but not on others, and they are, as a result, the most ill-defined of the terms; but it is roughly true to say that angels exist, are alive, and are intellectual, but are distinguished from humans by the fact that they are immaterial; they don't have bodies.​[8]​ This in itself is significant: angels are the first stage in the hierarchy where likeness to God is increased by the loss of a particular attribute, the body. Sometimes Thomas leaves angels aside and suggests that intellect is the distinctly human attribute, setting humankind apart from the inanimate objects, plants and animals.​[9]​ But at other times, the angels are set firmly within the order of creation, and at those times their presence has two effects. First, it implies that the distinctive feature of human nature is rationality, a specifically embodied intellect which sets us apart both from the irrational objects, plants and animals and from the immaterial angels.​[10]​ But second, the existence of disembodied beings higher up within the hierarchy of creation suggests that human movement towards God is, in some sense at least, movement up the hierarchy of being, and therefore movement away from human physicality.​[11]​ This ambiguity in the human relationship to angels is characteristic of Thomas' attitude to human embodiment more generally: throughout the Summa, Thomas is caught between the desire to locate human distinctiveness in the conjunction of body and soul and the sense that after a certain point, embodiment is precisely that which obstructs progress towards God. This tension is inextricably connected to Thomas' understanding of human calling and discipleship.

The beatific vision
	For Thomas, the ultimate end of human life is the beatific vision.​[12]​ This is the goal to which all human nature and ethical action is directed.  It is a destination which humankind has in common with other rational beings but, importantly, not with non-rational creatures.​[13]​ Human beings do, however, attain this vision of God in a distinctively human manner, which is to say that the beatific vision is, for humankind, an experience which involves the bodily senses,​[14]​ although sin can render the body a hindrance rather than a help to human knowledge.​[15]​ Yet even before sin, the body functioned in part to obstruct spiritual progress: Thomas says that Adam ‘used to see God in riddles because he saw him in created effects’.​[16]​ There is a sense that, to attain the beatific vision, the body and the manner of seeing it requires must be left behind, or at least transformed into something less material.​[17]​ Thomas states that, after the resurrection, 'man will be like an angel, having been rendered spiritual both in soul and in body’,​[18]​ and 'his animal life' will be 'over'.​[19]​ There is here a clear tension between the assertion of human distinctiveness as an embodied rationality and the upwards tug of the created hierarchy.

Virtue and law
	Unsurprisingly, this tension is replicated in Thomas' discussion of the virtues and the laws which characterise the human path towards the beatific vision. Both the virtues and the laws are hierarchically ordered, beginning with those virtues and laws which humans possess naturally and progressing upwards to the virtues and laws as they exist in the divine nature. In both cases, the movement up the hierarchy is a movement away from embodiment.
	Thomas defines virtue as ‘a good habit of mind.’​[20]​ Virtues are not material, though they engage with and exist in matter insofar as they exist in individual virtuous people and insofar as they have to do with the human passions and actions.​[21]​ Thomas' taxonomy of the different virtues is rather complex, but he starts by drawing a distinction between the moral and the intellectual virtues. The intellectual virtues are exclusively concerned with the speculative intellect, and the moral virtues are all concerned with the application of reason to human passion and action. Aquinas distinguishes between the appetite and the aptitude for doing good,  arguing that the intellectual virtues confer the ability but not the desire for good. Consequently, they are less important than the moral virtues, though this is not because they are less connected to human physicality, but because they cannot, on their own, move human beings towards God.
The moral virtues are prudence, justice, temperance and courage. Prudence is a moral and intellectual virtue, located in ‘our essentially rational part’ and concerns judgments of reason. It is, of the cardinal virtues ‘the principal simply speaking,’ overseeing the operation of the other three, which are located in ‘our derivatively rational part.’ Of the remaining virtues, justice belongs to the exercise of the will and is the application of reason to ‘what we do.’ Temperance and courage concern the application of reason to to the emotions which resist reason. Those emotions which ‘may incite us to something against reason’ are the province of temperance, and those which ‘may make us shirk a course of action dictated by reason, through fear of dangers or hardship’ belong to the activity of courage.​[22]​ The moral virtues are themselves divided into cardinal and theological virtues. The cardinal virtues are arranged hierarchically into political, purifying, purified and exemplar virtues.​[23]​ The exemplar virtues are the virtues as they exist in God;​[24]​ and human beings progress from the political virtues which ‘moderate’ the passions to the purifying virtues which ‘uproot’ them; and then to the purified virtues which ‘forget’ the passions as they are completely alien to God.​[25]​ The theological virtues -  faith, hope and love - are required to enable human beings to move beyond their natural capacities; and these come entirely from outside of human nature and have little to do with embodiment.​[26]​ In the development of the cardinal virtues and in the progression from moral to theological virtues, the movement towards God is a movement away from the body.
	Thomas' varieties of law correspond roughly to the four stages of the moral virtues, and entail a similar move away from human community and embodiment. The Eternal Law is the eternal principle of the laws in God just as the exemplar virtues are the eternal principle of the virtues in God.​[27]​ Human law consists of ‘the specific arrangements’ arrived at by human reasoning from the first principles of the natural law, and functions at the level of the political virtues, regulating the interactions of human society and limiting the passions.​[28]​ But it is is unable to direct human beings to the end beyond their nature, and so Divine Law, divided into Old and New Laws, takes over.​[29]​ The Old and New Laws, compared to childhood and adulthood, are directed to, respectively, human ‘material and earthly benefit’ and human ‘spiritual and heavenly good’.​[30]​ The development of the Divine Law thus mirrors the development of the cardinal virtues, moving ever inwards and upwards, directing human nature away from embodied physicality and towards God.​[31]​
	There is, then, a strong sense throughout Thomas' discussion of the virtues that the pursuit of God draws human beings away from their bodies and towards their supernatural end, despite Thomas' insistence elsewhere on humankind as constituted by body and soul together.

Active and contemplative
	In the Secunda Secundae, Thomas discusses the different modes of life available to human beings. He offers three alternative ways of life: the active life, the contemplative life, and the life of (physical) pleasure. However, the life of pleasure is a life of bodily pleasure, which we share with the animals; as such is not properly human, so the fundamental and ‘complete’ division of human life is into active and contemplative lives.​[32]​ The active life is the life directed towards external action, the life of those who ‘are primarily occupied with external activities’; and the contemplative life is directed towards 'truth itself', the life of those who ‘especially dedicate themselves to the contemplation of truth'.​[33]​ It initially seems that both are good possibilities for human beings: Thomas suggests that individuals are temperamentally disposed to one or the other according to ‘that in which each man most delights ... and that which he particularly wishes to share with his friends’.​[34]​ 
	The contemplative life engages human desire, intellect and will.​[35]​ The moral virtues prepare for it by overcoming the passions which are a hindrance to contemplation, but because of their focus on the passions and hence on the body, they belong more properly to the active life.​[36]​ Similarly, the exploration of the created world and the ways it reveals God may prepare the individual for the contemplative life but do not really belong to it:​[37]​ created things play a role in the progression towards the contemplative life, but are ultimately left behind. Thomas sets out a six-step progression towards the contemplative life: the aspiring contemplative begins with the ‘consideration of things of sense’; secondly transitions from sensible to intelligible things; thirdly evaluates sensual things with the mind; fourthly considers ‘intelligible things which have been reached through the sensible’; fifthly considers intelligible things which 'cannot be reached through the things of sense but can be understood by reason'; and finally, considers intelligible things which surpass the intellect.​[38]​ The movement towards God is a movement away from the sensible towards the intellectual.
	For Thomas, it is only within the contemplative life that it is possible to attain to the vision of God’s essence when, in rapture, a person completely disengages from their physical senses and even their imagination, which relies on physical images.​[39]​ Insofar as contemplation is difficult, it is due to ‘the weakness of our intellect and our corruptible body, which drags us down to lower things ... As a result, when a man attains the contemplation of truth, he loves it the more, but he deplores the more his own inadequacy and the weight of his corruptible body’.​[40]​ The body is a hindrance to the mind and it is only insofar as the contemplative ceases to 'work with the body' that they are able to sustain contemplation with a continuity comparable to that which all humans hope finally to attain in the beatific vision.​[41]​ 
	In contrast, the active life is directed to external activity, and is the proper domain of the moral virtues insofar as their works are ‘intended as goods for their own sake and not as dispositions for the contemplative life’.​[42]​ The active life is humanly possible in this life only, as the final destination of human nature is the contemplation of God in the beatific vision,. But the angels will continue in both the active and contemplative life, both because the two are not distinguished for them and it is natural to them to administer ‘a lower creation’.​[43]​ This is interesting, as elsewhere​[44]​ Thomas argues that it is proper for humankind to have dominion over everything in creation bar the angels, so the cessation of this ruling activity suggests either a change in human nature or the dissolution of the physical world which humankind would otherwise rule.
	Thomas is absolutely clear that the contemplative life is superior to the active life, setting out nine reasons for this superiority (eight drawn from Aristotle and one from the teachings of Christ). These include the fact that the contemplative life is ‘concerned with divine things, but the active life is concerned with human affairs,’ and that ‘the contemplative life is lived by that which is most proper to man, namely his mind, whereas the activities of the active life involve also the lower powers, common to men and to animals.’ There are situations in which the active life takes precedence ‘in view of the needs of the present life,’ but even when people must take up external activities again, this is ‘not to such an extent as to be compelled to forsake contemplation’.​[45]​ The contemplative life is also superior because it ‘has direct and immediate reference to the love of God,’ whereas the active life ‘is more directly ordained to the love of neighbour’.​[46]​ The active life ‘precedes the contemplative life’ insofar as it prepares for and leads to the contemplative life, and ‘as that which is common to all precedes that which is proper to the perfect.’ It is suitable for ‘those who are more prone to yield to their passions’ whereas the contemplative life suits those who ‘have a naturally pure and calm spirit’.​[47]​ However proper it may be to divide human life into active and contemplative, it is clear that the contemplative life is more properly human than the active.
	In his discussion of the active and contemplative lives, the balance in Thomas' thought between the affirmation of the goodness of the body and the desire to transcend embodiment tips clearly in favour of leaving behind the body in the pursuit of God. Throughout Thomas' discussion of the active and contemplative lives there is a sense that the body is to be left behind, at best a stepping stone on the way to the realm of the intellect, and at worst a hindrance and a temptation to sin.

Conclusion
	Denys Turner argues that ‘the better a theologian is placed in his intellectual and cultural context, the more difficult it is for him to be used to inform theology today.’​[48]​ This is surely true of Thomas, whose anthropology relies heavily on angels and a metaphysics of hierarchy for his anthropology; who writes as though monasticism is the only option for those serious about the pursuit of God, and who displays a deeply ambiguous view of the body. None of these sit comfortably with contemporary ethical debates, and nor should they; none can easily be abstracted from Thomas' thought as unfortunate but insignificant. These ideas profoundly shape Thomas' whole vision of human nature, the body, and ethics, and any serious reading must take them into account. The contemplative life which Thomas valorises is the life of the elite and wealthy minority, the life of the mind, a life very far removed from the lives of most human beings, although not (with the possible exception of the wealth!) from the lives of academic theologians. The life of the mind, the life of the academic may be important, but it is not the typical human experience, and theology would do well to recognise this. If academic theology wishes to speak meaningfully to or even about the human condition, about the lives of women, the poor, the excluded and the marginalised, it would do well to question its context and to take more seriously the question of embodiment and all it implies for many people: the struggle to eat, to hold together families, to hold down jobs. Theologians' lives are not the lives of the majority of people, the majority of Christians; this doesn't much worry Thomas, but it should worry us.
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